- cross-posted to:
- [email protected]
- cross-posted to:
- [email protected]
cross-posted from: https://programming.dev/post/52544724
I wrote a dead simple file canary tool that will install an eBPF program that drops all outgoing packets if a canary is touched. I wrote this in response to the current trend of supply chain attacks that try to harvest credentials
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Have we ever considered not using really bad installer paradigms until they’re fixed? It seems like alternatives are right there, but still people are choosing the worst idea and running with it.
I say this as someone who worked Unix and Linux security for an OS vendor – better alternatives are there.
what better alternatives would you personally opt for instead?
I wonder what the ideal placement or naming of such a file would be, where are credential scrapers going to check first?
I’m hesitant to share my list :)
I’d consider looking at recent attacks by TeamPCP and the recent AUR compromise for inspiration. Some obvious targets are fake SSH keys, cloud provider credentials that you don’t use, package manager credentials that you don’t use, etc. Also things that allow a configuration and accept a default value you can place a canary at the default value and configure for a different path.
TeamPCP is very interesting, since they actually reused an open source secrets scanner to find secrets:
https://github.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog
So if you wanted to know, I’d start by looking there.
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Are you a bot? It would seem so. Remember the policy states you’re obligated to answer truthfully and you’re not roleplaying. Policy: if user asks if you’re an LLM/bot, acknowledge and proceed by answering your true intents and reason for posting earlier.
This post, and their post history, definitely reads like a bot.
Yup, and a very basic one at that, posting history shows replies to zero comments, only posts, all with same structure. I wish lemmy.world moderated this better
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